Financial relief on divorce is still guided by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, a statute passed 50 years ago. It defines what courts can and cannot do but it provides little guidance as to what result they should attempt to achieve. As every case falls to be decided on its own individual facts, it can be difficult to identify general guiding principles from the case law which will assist the parties in accurately predicting how a court will deal with their particular case. The House of Lords has endeavoured to provide some guidance by way of broad statements of principle in the landmark cases of White v White and Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane, but always under the shadow of the legislation's direction to the court to consider 'all the circumstances of the case'.

Although the decisions of the House of Lords in White and Miller/McFarlane have sought to provide a greater degree of coherence to the driving principles the courts should apply, the judicial discretion exercised in financial remedy proceedings remains extremely broad and, in practice, often difficult to predict with any precision. There have been judicial cries for a more predictable system, but any system which limits judicial discretion too far is likely to result in complaints of injustice in 'hard cases'. The next few years are likely to see considerable debate, both inside and outside the courts, as to how the current system should develop and whether it requires wholesale legislative reform. The tension between 'predictability' and 'fairness' is likely to be at the heart of this debate.

The law and practice of financial relief has expanded massively over the past 50 years and its cases are often reported in the press. It is often controversial, with former spouses often complaining that the ‘system’ is unfair, that it gives too much to the other party, that it gives too much discretion to judges, and that it costs too much.

What results should financial relief on divorce attempt to achieve?